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Abstract—This paper presents a novel attack on voice-
controlled digital assistants using nonsensical word sequences.
We present the results of experimental work which demonstrates
that it is possible for malicious actors to gain covert access to
a voice-controlled system by hiding commands in apparently
nonsensical sounds of which the meaning is opaque to humans.
Several instances of nonsensical word sequences were identified
which triggered a target command in a voice-controlled digital
assistant, but which were incomprehensible to humans, as shown
in tests with human experimental subjects. Our work confirms
the potential for hiding malicious voice commands to voice-
controlled digital assistants or other speech-controlled devices
in speech sounds which are perceived by humans as nonsensical.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing popularity of voice-controlled digital assis-
tants, such as Google Assistant, brings with it new types of
security challenges. Input to a speech interface is difficult to
control. Furthermore, attacks via a speech interface are not
limited to voice commands which are detectable by human
users. Malicious input may also come from the space of sounds
to which humans allocate a different meaning to the system,
or no meaning at all. In this paper, we show that it is possible
to hide malicious voice commands to the voice-controlled
digital assistant Google Assistant in ‘nonsense’ words which
are perceived as meaningless by humans.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II outlines the prior work in this area. Section III provides
some relevant background on phonetics and speech recog-
nition. Section IV details the methodology that was applied
in the experimental work. This includes the process used to
generate potential adversarial commands consisting of nonsen-
sical word sounds. It also includes the processes for testing
the response of Google Assistant to the potential adversarial
commands, and for testing the comprehensibility of adversarial
commands by humans. Section V presents the results of the
experimental work. Section VI discusses the implications of
the experimental results. Section VII makes some suggestions
for future work and concludes the paper.
II. PRIOR WORK
The idea of attacking voice-controlled digital assistants by
hiding voice commands in sound which is meaningless or
imperceptible to humans has been investigated in prior work.
Carlini et al. [1] have presented results showing it is possible to
hide malicious commands to voice-controlled digital assistants
in apparently meaningless noise, whereas Zhang et al.[2] have
shown that it is possible to hide commands in sound which is
inaudible. Whereas this prior work demonstrated voice attacks
which are perceived by humans as noise and silence, the
aim of this work was to develop a novel attack based on
‘nonsense’ sounds which have some phonetic similarity with
the words of a relevant target command. In related work by
Papernot et al. [3], it was shown that a sentiment analysis
method could be misled by input which was ‘nonsensical’ at
the sentence level, i.e. the input consisted of a nonsensical
concatenation of real words. By contrast, this work examines
whether voice-controlled digital assistants can be misled by
input which consists of nonsensical word sounds. Nonsense
attacks are one of the categories of possible attacks via the
speech interface which have been identified in a taxonomy
developed by Bispham et al. [4].
Outside the context of attacks via the speech interface,
differences between human and machine abilities to recognise
nonsense syllables have been studied for example by Lipp-
mann et al. [5] and Scharenborg and Cooke [6]. Bailey and
Hahn [7] examine the relationship between theoretical mea-
sures of phoneme similarity based on phonological features,
such as might be used in automatic speech recognition, and
empirically determined measures of phoneme confusability
based on human perception tests. Machine speech recognition
has reached parity with human abilities in terms of the ability
correctly to transcribe meaningful speech (see Xiong et al. [8]),
but not in terms of the ability to distinguish meaningful from
meaningless sounds. The inability of machines to identify non-
sense sounds as meaningless is exploited for security purposes
by Meutzner et al. [9], who have developed a CAPTCHA
based on the insertion of random nonsense sounds in audio.
The opposite scenario, i.e. the possible security problems
associated with machine inability to distinguish sense from
nonsense, has to the best of our knowledge not been exploited
in prior work.
III. BACKGROUND
The idea for this work was inspired by the use of nonsense
words to teach phonics to primary school children.1 ‘Non-
sense’ is defined in this context as sounds which are composed
of the sound units which are used in a given language, but to
1See The Telegraph, 1st May 2014, “Infants taught to read ‘nonsense words’
in English lessons”
which no meaning is allocated within the current usage of
that language. Such sound units are known as ‘phonemes’.2
English has around 44 phonemes.3 The line between phoneme
combinations which carry meaning within a language and
phoneme combinations which are meaningless is subject to
change over time and place, as new words evolve and old
words fall out of use (see Nowak and Krakauer [10]). The
space of meaningful word sounds within a language at a
given point in time is generally confirmed by the inclusion
of words in a generally established reference work, such as,
in the case of English, the Oxford English Dictionary.4 In this
work, we tested the response of Google Assistant to English
word sounds which were outside this space of meaningful
word sounds, but which had a ‘rhyming’ relationship with
meaningful words recognised as commands by Google As-
sistant. The term ‘rhyme’ is used to refer to a number of
different sound relationships between words (see for example
McCurdy et al. [11]), but it is most commonly used to refer
to a correspondence of word endings.5 For the purposes of
our experimental work we define rhyme according to this
commonly understood sense as words which share the same
ending.
There are a number of features of speech recognition
in voice-controlled digital assistants which might affect the
processing of nonsense syllables by such systems. One of these
features is the word space which the assistant has been trained
to recognise. The number of words which a voice assistant
such as Google Assistant can transcribe is much larger than
the number of words which it can ‘understand’ in the sense of
being able to map them to an executable command. In order
to be able to perform tasks such as web searches by voice and
note taking, a voice-controlled digital assistant must be able to
transcribe all words in current usage within a language. It can
therefore be assumed that the speech recognition functionality
in Google Assistant must have access to a phonetic dictionary
of all English words. We conducted some preliminary tests
to determine whether this phonetic dictionary also includes
nonsense words, so as to enable the assistant to recognise such
words as meaningless. Using the example of the nonsense
word sequence ‘voo terg spron’, we tested the response of
Google Assistant to nonsense syllables by speaking them in
natural voice to a microphone three times. The nonsense word
sequence was variably transcribed as ‘bedtime song’, ‘who
text Rob’, and ‘blue tux prom’, i.e. the Assistant sought to
match the nonsense syllables to meaningful words, rather than
recognising them as meaningless. This confirmed the viability
of our experiment in which we sought to engineer the matching
of nonsense words to a target command.
Another feature of speech recognition in voice assistant
which might affect the processing of nonsense syllables is
2See for example https://www.britannica.com/topic/phoneme
3See for example https://www.dyslexia-reading-well.com/44-phonemes-in-
english.html
4See for example https://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/press-releases/new-
words-added-oxforddictionaries-com-august-2014/
5see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/rhyme
the influence of a language model. Modern speech recognition
technology includes both an acoustic modelling and a language
modelling component. The acoustic modelling component
computes the likelihood of the acoustic features within a
segment of speech having been produced by a given word. The
language modelling component calculates the probability of
one word following another word or words within an utterance.
The acoustic model is typically based on Gaussian Mixture
Models or deep neural networks (DNNs), whereas the lan-
guage model is typically based on n-grams or recurrent neural
networks (RNNs). Google’s speech recognition technology as
incorporated in Google Assistant is based on neural networks.6
The words most likely to have produced a sequence of speech
sounds are determined by calculation of the product of the
acoustic model and the language model outputs. The language
model is intended to complement the acoustic model, in the
sense that it may correct ‘errors’ on the part of the acoustic
model in matching a set of acoustic features to words which
are not linguistically valid in the context of the preceding
words. This assumption of complementary functionality is
valid in a cooperative context, where a user interacts via
a speech interface in meaningful language. However, the
assumption of complementarity is not valid in an adversarial
context, where an attacker is seeking to engineer a mismatch
between a set of speech sounds as perceived by a human, such
as the nonsensical speech sounds generated here, and their
transcription by a speech-controlled device. In an adversarial
context such as that investigated here, the language model may
in fact operate in the attacker’s favour, in that if one ‘nonsense’
word in an adversarial command is misrecognised as a target
command word, subsequent words in the adversarial command
will be more likely to be misrecognised as target command
words in turn, as the language model trained to recognise
legitimate commands will allocate a high probability to the
target command words which follow the initial one. Human
speech processing also uses an internal ‘lexicon’ to match
speech sounds to words (see for example Roberts et al. [12]).
However, as mentioned above, unlike machines, humans also
have an ability to recognise speech sounds as nonsensical. This
discrepancy between machine and human processing of word
sounds was the basis of our attack methodology for hiding
malicious commands to voice assistants in nonsense words.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The experimental work comprised three stages. The first
stage involved generating from a set of target commands a set
of potential adversarial commands consisting of nonsensical
word sequences. These potential adversarial commands were
generated using a mangling process which involved replacing
consonant phonemes in target command words to create a
rhyming word sound, and then determining whether the result-
ing rhyming word sound was a meaningful word in English
or a ‘nonsense word’. For the purposes of this work, the
6See Google AI blog, 11th August 2015, ‘The neural networks behind
Google Voice transcription’ https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/08/the-neural-
networks-behind-google-voice.html
Unix word list was considered representative of the current
space of meaningful sounds in English. Word sounds identified
as nonsense words were used to create potential adversarial
commands. Audio versions of these potential adversarial com-
mands were created using speech synthesis technology. The
second stage of the experimental work was to test the response
of the target system to the potential adversarial commands.
The target system for experiments on machine perception of
nonsensical word sequences was the voice-controlled digital
assistant Google Assistant. The Google Assistant system was
accessed via the Google Assistant Software Development Kit
(SDK).7 The third stage of the experimental work was to
test the human comprehensibility of adversarial commands
which were successful in triggering a target action in the target
system.
A. Adversarial Command Generation
A voice-controlled digital assistant such as Google Assistant
typically performs three generic types of action, namely infor-
mation extraction, control of a cyber-physical action, and data
input. The data input category may overlap with the control
of cyber-physical action category where a particular device
setting needs to be specified, eg. light color or thermostat
temperature. The three generic action categories are reflected
in three different command structures for commands to Google
Assistant and other voice-controlled digital assistants. The
three command structures are: vocative + interrogative (eg. ‘Ok
Google, what is my IP address’), vocative + imperative (eg.
‘Ok Google, turn on the light’), and vocative + imperative +
data (eg. ’Ok Google, take a note that cats are great’). For our
experimental work, we chose 5 three-word target commands
corresponding to 5 target actions, covering all three possible
target action categories. These target commands were: “What’s
my name” (target action: retrieve username, action category:
information extraction), “Turn on light” (target action: turn
light on, action category: control of cyber-physical action),
“Turn off light” (target action: turn light off, action category:
control of cyber-physical action), “Turn light red” (target
action: turn light to red, action category: data input), “Turn
light blue” (target action: turn light to blue, action category:
data input). We originally included a sixth target command,
which would have represented a second target command for
the information extraction category: “Who am I”. However,
no successful adversarial commands could be generated from
this target command.
A set of potential adversarial commands was created from
the target commands using a mangling process. This man-
gling process was based on replacing consonant phonemes
in the target command words to generate nonsensical word
sounds which rhymed with the original target command word.8
The target commands were first translated to a phonetic
7See https://developers.google.com/assistant/sdk/
8Our approach was inspired by an educational game in which a set
of nonsense words is generated by spinning lettered wooden cubes - see
https://rainydaymum.co.uk/spin-a-word-real-vs-nonsense-words/
representation in the Kirschenbaum phonetic alphabet9 using
the ‘espeak’ functionality in Linux. The starting consonant
phonemes of each word of the target command were then
replaced with a different starting consonant phoneme, using a
Python script and referring to a list of starting consonants and
consonant blends.10 Where the target command word began
with a vowel phoneme, a starting consonant phoneme was
prefixed to the vowel. The resulting word sounds were checked
for presence in a phonetic representation of the Unix word
list, also generated with espeak, to ascertain whether the word
sound represented a meaningful English word or not. If the
sound did correspond to a meaningful word, it was discarded.
This process thus generated from each target command a
number of rhyming nonsensical phoneme sequences to which
no English meaning was attached. Audio versions of the
phoneme sequences were then created using espeak. A similar
process was followed to generate a set of potential adversarial
commands from the wake-up word ‘Hey Google’. In addition
to replacing the starting consonants ‘H’ and ‘G’, the second
‘g’ in ‘Google’ was also replaced with one of the consonants
which are found in combination with the ‘-le’ ending in
English.11
Nonsensical word sequences generated from the ‘Hey
Google’ wake-up word and nonsensical word sequences gener-
ated from target commands which were successful respectively
in activating the assistant and triggering a target action in audio
file input tests (see Results section for details) were combined
with one another to generate a set of potential adversarial
commands for over-the-air tests. This resulted in a total of
225 nonsensical word sequences representing a concatenation
of each of 15 nonsensical word sequences generated from the
wake-up word with each of 15 nonsensical word sequences
generated from a target command. Audio versions of these
225 nonsensical word sequences were generated using the
Amazon Polly speech synthesis service, generating a set of
.wav files.12 Amazon Polly is the speech synthesis technology
used by Amazon Alexa, hence the over-the-air tests repre-
sented a potential attack on Google Assistant with ‘Alexa’s’
voice. The audio contained a brief pause between the wake-
up word and the command, as is usual in natural spoken
commands to voice assistants. As Amazon Polly uses the x-
sampa phonetic alphabet rather than the Kirschenbaum format,
it was necessary prior to synthesis to translate the phonetic
representations of the potential adversarial commands from
Kirschenbaum to x-sampa format.
B. Assistant Response Tests
The Google Assistant SDK was integrated in a Ubuntu
virtual machine (version 18.04). The Assistant was integrated
in the virtual machine using two options; firstly, the Google
Assistant Service, and secondly the Google Assistant Library.
9See http://espeak.sourceforge.net/phonemes.html
10See https://k-3teacherresources.com/teaching-resource/printable-phonics-
charts/
11See https://howtospell.co.uk/
12See https://aws.amazon.com/polly/
The Google Assistant Service is activated via keyboard stroke
and thus does not require a wake-up word, and voice com-
mands can be inputted as audio files as well as over the air
via a microphone. The Google Assistant Library, on the other
hand, does require a wake-up word for activation, and receives
commands via a microphone only. The Google Assistant
Service could therefore be used to test adversarial commands
for target commands and for the wake-up word separately
and via audio file input rather than via a microphone. The
Google Assistant Library could be used to test the activation
of the Assistant and the triggering of a target command by an
adversarial command in combination over the air, representing
a more realistic attack scenario.
Some additions to the source code for the Google Assistant
Service were made in order to print the Assistant’s spoken
responses to commands to the terminal in text form, as well
to print a confirmation of two non-verbal actions by the
Assistant, namely ‘turn light red’ and ‘turn light blue’. Similar
amendments were made to the source code for the Google
Assistant Library in order to print a confirmation of these
two non-verbal actions for which the Assistant did not print a
confirmation to the terminal by default.
We first tested the Assistant’s response to plain-speech
versions of each target command to confirm that these trig-
gered the relevant target action. Using Python scripts, we then
generated nonsense word sequences from the wake-up word
‘hey Google’ and from each target command in batches of
100 and tested the response of Google Assistant Service to
audio file input of the potential adversarial commands for
wake-up word and target commands separately. The choice
of consonant phoneme to be replaced to generate nonsense
words was performed randomly by the Python scripts for each
batch of 100 potential adversarial commands. We continued
the testing process until we had generated 15 successful
adversarial commands for the wake-up word, and 3 success-
ful adversarial commands for each target command, i.e. 15
successful adversarial commands in total. Each successful
adversarial command for the wake-up word and each suc-
cessful adversarial command for a target command were then
combined to generate potential adversarial commands for the
over-the-air tests as described above.
In the over-the-air tests, the 225 potential adversarial com-
mands generated from the adversarial commands for the wake-
up word and target commands which had been successful in
the audio file input tests were played to the Google Assistant
Library via a USB plug-in microphone from an Android
smartphone.
C. Human Comprehensibility Tests
We next tested the human comprehensibility of adversarial
commands which had successfully triggered a target action
by the Assistant. Human experimental subjects were recruited
via the online platform Prolific Academic.13 All subjects were
native speakers of English. The subjects were asked to listen to
13https://prolific.ac/
Fig. 1. Transcription of response to adversarial command for
‘Hey Google’ from audio file
Wakeup word triggered by nonsense_wakeup/Z’eI d’u:b@L.raw, nonsense_wakeup/Z’eI d’u:b@L
INFO:root:Connecting to embeddedassistant.googleapis.com
INFO:root:Recording audio request.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "change".
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "JD".
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "hey dude".
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "hey Google".
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "hey Google".
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "hey Google".
INFO:root:End of audio request detected.
INFO:root:Stopping recording.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "hey Google".
INFO:root:Expecting follow-on query from user.
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
audio of twelve successful adversarial commands, which were
the successful adversarial commands shown in Tables 1 and
2 for the audio file input and over-the-air tests respectively
(see Results section for further details). The audio which
subjects were asked to listen to also included as ‘attention
tests’, two files consisting of synthesised audio of two easily
understandable utterances, “Hello how are you” and “Hi how
are you”. Subjects were then asked to indicate whether they
had identified any meaning in the audio. If they had identified
meaning, they were asked to indicate what meaning they
heard. The order in which audio clips were presented to the
participants was randomised.
V. RESULTS
A. Assistant Response Tests
Through application of the methodology described above,
the audio file input tests for the wake-up word ‘Hey Google’
identified 15 successful adversarial commands which triggered
activation of the device. The audio file input tests for target
commands identified 3 successful adversarial commands for
each target action, i.e. 15 successful adversarial commands in
total, in around 2000 tests. Three examples of the successful
adversarial commands for the wake-up word and one example
of an adversarial command for each of the target commands is
shown in Table 1. The over-the-air tests identified 4 successful
adversarial commands in the 225 tests (representing all pos-
sible combinations of each of the 15 successful adversarial
commands for the wake-up word with each of the successful
adversarial commands for the target commands). One of
the successful over-the-air adversarial commands triggered
the ‘turn on light’ target action and three of the successful
over-the-air adversarial commands triggered the ‘turn light
red’ target action. The 4 successful over-the-air adversarial
commands are shown in Table 2. Also shown below, in Figures
1 and 2, are examples of the print-out to terminal of the
Google Assistant Service’s response to a successful adversarial
command for a wake-up word and for a target command.
Further shown below is an example of the print-out to terminal
of the Google Assistant Library’s response to a successful
over-the-air adversarial command (see Figure 3).
In repeated tests, it was shown that the audio file input
results were reproducible, whereas the over-the-air results were
not, i.e. a successful adversarial command did not necessarily
Target
Command
Adversarial
Command
(Kirschen-
baum phonetic
symbols)
Text
Transcribed
Action
Triggered
Hey Google S’eI j’u:b@L
(“shay
yooble”)
hey Google assistant acti-
vated
Hey Google t’eI g’u:t@L
(“tay gootle”)
hey Google assistant acti-
vated
Hey Google Z’eI d’u:b@L
(“zhay
dooble”)
hey Google assistant acti-
vated
turn off light h’3:n z’0f j’aIt
(“hurn zof
yight)
turns off the
light
Turning device
off
turn light blue h’3:n gl’aIt
skw’u: (“hurn
glight squoo”
turn the lights
blue
color is blue
turn light red str’3:n j’aIt
str’Ed (“strurn
yight stred”
turn the lights
to Red
color is red
what’s my
name
sm’0ts k’aI
sp’eIm
(“smots kai
spaim”)
what’s my
name
You told me
your name was
MK
turn on light p’3:n h’0n
kl’aIt (“purn
hon klight”)
turn on light Turning device
on
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL ADVERSARIAL COMMANDS IN AUDIO FILE
INPUT EXPERIMENTS
Target
Command
Adversarial
Command
(x-sampa
phonetic
symbols)
Text
Transcribed
Action
Triggered
Hey Google
turn on light
t’eI D’u:bl=
s’3:n Z’Qn
j’aIt (“tay
dooble surn
zhon yight”)
switch on the
light
Turning the
LED on
Hey Google
turn light red
t’eI D’u:bl=
tr’3:n Tr’aIt
str’Ed (“tay
dooble trurn
thright stred”)
turn lights to
Red
The color is
red
Hey Google
turn light red
t’eI D’u:bl=
pr’3:n j’aIt
sw’Ed (“tay
dooble prurn
yight swed”)
turn the lights
red
The color is
red
Hey Google
turn light red
t’eI D’u:bl=
str’3:n j’aIt
str’Ed (“tay
dooble strurn
yight stred”)
turn lights to
Red
The color is
red
TABLE II
SUCCESSFUL ADVERSARIAL COMMANDS IN OVER-THE-AIR EXPERIMENTS
Fig. 2. Transcription of response to adversarial command for
‘what’s my name’ (sm’0ts k’aI sp’eIm) from audio file
INFO:root:Recording audio request.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "some".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "summer".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s on Sky".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s my IP".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "some months cause pain".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s my car’s paint".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s my car’s paint".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:End of audio request detected
INFO:root:Transcript of user request: "what’s my name".
INFO:root:Playing assistant response.
INFO:root:You told me your name was MK
I could never forget that
INFO:root:Finished playing assistant response.
Fig. 3. Transcription of response to adversarial command for
‘Hey Google turn on light’ (t’eI D’u:bl= s’3:n Z’Qn j’aIt) from
over-the-air audio
ON_CONVERSATION_TURN_STARTED
ON_END_OF_UTTERANCE
ON_RECOGNIZING_SPEECH_FINISHED:
{"text": "switch on the light"}
Do command action.devices.commands.OnOff with params {u’on’: True}
Turning the LED on.
ON_RESPONDING_STARTED:
{"is_error_response": false}
ON_RESPONDING_FINISHED
ON_CONVERSATION_TURN_FINISHED:
{"with_follow_on_turn": false}
trigger the target action again on re-playing. Apart from the
triggering target commands as described, a certain proportion
of the nonsensical word sequences tested in the experiments
were transcribed as other meaningful word sequences, prompt-
ing the Assistant to run web searches. For other nonsensical
word sequences, the Assistant’s response was simply to indi-
cate non-comprehension of the input.
B. Human Comprehensibility Tests
As stated above, audio clips of the twelve successful ad-
versarial commands shown in Tables 1 and 2, as well as two
audio clips representing attention tests, were played to human
subjects in an online experiment. There were 20 participants
in the experiment, from whom 17 sets of valid results could
be retrieved. All 17 participants who generated these results
transcribed the attention tests correctly as ‘hi how are you’
and ’hello how are you’. Three participants transcribed one
adversarial command as the target command ‘turn on light’,
but did not identify any of the other target commands or the
wake-up word ‘Hey Google’ in either the audio file input
clips or the over-the-air clips. None of the other participants
identified any of the target commands or the wake-up word in
any of the clips. Eight of the participants identified no meaning
at all in any of the clips which did not represent attention tests.
The other participants all either indicated incomprehension
of the nonsensical sounds as well or else transcribed them
as words which were unrelated to the target command for
Google Assistant. Some examples of unrelated transcriptions
were ‘hands off the yacht’ and ‘smoking cause pain’. One
participant also transcribed some of the nonsensical sounds
as nonsense syllables e.g. ‘hurn glights grew’ and ‘pern pon
clight’. Another participant also transcribed a couple of the
nonsensical sounds as the French words ‘Je du blanc’.
VI. DISCUSSION
The combined results from our machine response and
human comprehensibility tests confirm that voice-controlled
digital assistants are potentially vulnerable to covert attacks
using nonsensical sounds. The key findings are that voice
commands to voice-controlled digital assistant Google Assis-
tant are shown to be triggered by nonsensical word sounds in
some instances, whereby the same nonsensical word sounds
are perceived by humans as either not having any meaning at
all or as having a meaning unrelated to the voice commands
to the Assistant. One notable feature of the results is that the
transcription of the adversarial command by the Assistant does
not need to match the target command exactly in order to
trigger the target action; for example, an adversarial command
for the target command ‘turn on light’ is transcribed as ‘switch
on the light’ in one instance (see Table 2). In one case, the
transcription of an adversarial command does not even need to
be semantically equivalent to the target command in order to
trigger the target action, as for example in the transcription of
an adversarial command for “turn off light” as “turns off the
light”. This attack exploits a weakness in the natural language
understanding functionality of the Assistant as well as in its
speech recognition functionality.
The machine and human responses to nonsensical word
sounds in general were comparable, in that both machine and
humans frequently indicated incomprehension of the sounds,
or else attempted to fit them to meaningful words. However,
in the specific instances of nonsensical word sounds which
triggered a target command in Google Assistant, none of the
human listeners heard a Google Assistant voice command in
the nonsensical word sounds which had triggered a target
command. Another difference between the machine and hu-
man results was that whereas in addition to either indicating
incomprehension or transcribing the nonsensical sounds as real
words, human subjects on occasion attempted to transcribe the
nonsensical word sounds phonetically as nonsense syllables,
the Assistant always either indicated incomprehension or at-
tempted to match the nonsensical sounds to real words. This
confirms that, unlike humans, the Assistant does not have a
concept of word sounds which have no meaning, making it
vulnerable to being fooled by word sounds which are perceived
by humans as obviously nonsensical.
VII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on this small-scale study, we conclude that voice-
controlled digital assistants are potentially vulnerable to ma-
licious input consisting of nonsense syllables which humans
perceive as meaningless. A focus of future work might be to
conduct a larger scale study and to conduct a more fine-tuned
analysis of successful and unsuccessful nonsense attacks, to
determine which nonsense syllables are most likely to be
confused with target commands by machines, whilst still being
perceived as nonsensical by humans. This would enable inves-
tigation of more targeted attacks. Ultimately the focus of future
work should be to consider how voice-controlled systems
might be better trained to distinguish between meaningful and
meaningless sound in terms of the language to which they are
intended to respond.
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